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Abstract: This paper deals with the passenger screening procedure at airports. A survey on the 
acceptability of security scanners was conducted in France in July 2012 with a sample of 458 air 
travellers. Acceptability was operationalized in terms of behavioural intention to undergo scanning if 
such scanners were implemented at French airports. The great majority of the respondents would 
choose to pass through a security scanner whatever the representation used by the system to display 
potential hidden objects (a fuzzy image of the body of the passenger or a generic avatar). Despite their 
possible lack of knowledge on the efficiency of the technology, most of the respondents trusted 
security scanners to detect hidden explosives. Finally, the majority of the respondents did not perceive 
such scanning as a breach of fundamental rights. By way of discussion, a model is proposed which 
expresses that acceptance would emerge from a cognitive compromise between expected benefits, 
accepted risks, and tolerated constraints. The compromise would be shaped by trust and perceptions, 
which would themselves be shaped by knowledge and socially shared affect and values.  
Keywords: Acceptability; Acceptance; Cognitive compromise; Opinion survey; Trust; Security 
scanner. 
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1. Introduction  
France, as a Member State of the European 
Union (EU), the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC), and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), has 
become involved in strengthening aviation 
security measures. This paper focuses on a 
specific ground security measure at airports, 
namely the passenger body screening.  
Indeed, international airports have 
progressively been equipped with walk-
through body screening scanners based on X-
ray or millimeter wave technologies. These 
systems are officially termed „security 
scanners‟ in the EU (see European 
Commission, 2010).  
Security scanners are capable of detecting 
objects under clothes; not only metallic objects 
such as knives and arms but also non-metallic 
objects such as plastic and liquid explosives. 
These imaging technologies provide either 
images of the body of the person who is 
scanned or images of a generic avatar that 
resembles a human outline.  
Advanced imaging technology being at the 
heart of security scanners, these systems are a 
source of controversy, notably in the form of 
privacy, health, and performance issues. Public 
concern about these issues raises the problem 
of the acceptance of security scanners.  
The present paper aims to consider the 
psychological aspects of the acceptability and 
acceptance of security scanners at airports. 
Acceptability and acceptance can be 
operationalized in terms of intentional 
behaviour (e.g. Ausserer and Risser, 2005). 
When air travellers‟ intentional behaviour is 
considered before the deployment of the 
technology, it is termed acceptability; after the 
deployment, it is termed acceptance (Schade 
and Schlag, 2010).  
Section 2 deals with three issues that may 
influence air travellers‟ acceptability and 
acceptance of security scanners: the privacy 
and fundamental rights; the passenger‟s health; 
the systems‟ performance. Section 3 presents 
two empirical studies of the literature on the 
acceptance of security body scanners. The first 
study was carried out with air travellers in New 
York City and Tel Aviv, the second one with 
air travellers in the UK. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results of an opinion survey on 
the acceptability of security scanners carried 
out in France in July 2012. A model of 
acceptance that takes into account the results 
of the three studies is proposed at the end of 
the paper.     
2. Issues that may influence the 
acceptance of security scanners 
2.1. Privacy and fundamental rights issues 
The protection of privacy and fundamental 
rights is recognized by governmental 
institutions as being a primary issue with the 
use of security scanners (e.g. Cavoukian, 2009; 
UK Department for Transport, 2010; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011). 
About Europe, the following parts of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union are pertained to the use of 
security scanners: human dignity; respect for 
private and family life; freedom of thoughts, 
conscience, and religion; non-discrimination; 
the rights of child; ensuring a high level of 
human health protection; protection of 
personal data (European Commission, 2010, p. 
4).  
Whatever the representation displayed on 
the screen, personal data are processed. 
According to the European Union, “personal 
data” means any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual ("data 
subject"), and "automatic processing" includes 
the following operations if carried out in whole 
or in part by automated means: data storage, 
carrying out logical and/or arithmetical 
operations on those data, and their alteration, 
erasure, retrieval or dissemination (Council of 
Europe, 1981).  
From the researchers‟ point of view, for 
example, Olga Mironenko from the University 
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of Oslo (Norway), the use of body scanners 
seriously impacts the rights to privacy and data 
protection even if it may contribute to 
maintaining a high level of security, notably 
regarding terrorism (Mironenko, 2011). She 
noticed that the images created by body 
scanners could be considered personal data and 
that the use of these data, even not recorded, 
fell within the definition of processing (i.e. any 
operation performed upon personal data). 
Finally, she emphasizes that the storage and 
retrieval of images is the most controversial 
point for discussion.  
According to Raphael Gellert and Serge 
Gutwirth from Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
(Belgium), even though the images produced 
by body scanners are anonymous, they “must 
not necessarily be considered as non-personal 
data” (Geller and Gutwirth, 2013, p. 527).  
In view to these conclusions, it would be 
interesting to know the passengers‟ opinions 
on breaches of privacy and fundamental rights 
regarding the use of security scanners. It would 
also be interesting to know their trust in airport 
authorities to protect personal data. Indeed, the 
points of view of experts and the public may 
not coincide. It may be that the problem of the 
acceptability of security scanners in terms of 
privacy is not a real one for the majority of 
passengers. An argument for this view is the 
case of video surveillance. It is possible that 
the decisions made by institutions to increase 
aviation safety are seen by citizens as justified 
because the threats are objectivized (Dumoulin 
et al., 2010). Another argument comes from 
the domain of biometric technologies: people 
tend to consider being under surveillance as 
natural (Crampton, 2007) and adopt a level of 
social indifference (Van Den Hoogen, 2009).  
Therefore, besides investigating the air 
travellers‟ views on potential breaches of 
fundamental rights, it would be interesting to 
know whether they consider passing through 
security scanner to be normal and 
unquestionable regarding the threat of 
terrorism. 
2.2. Health issues 
Security scanners also raise health concerns 
because they are based on technologies 
exposing the passenger to electromagnetic 
radiation. Two reports about health risks are 
presented, one based on X-ray backscatter 
technology and the other on millimeter wave 
technology.  
The Scientific Committee on Emerging and 
Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR), an 
advisory structure of scientific committees and 
experts in the field of consumer safety, public 
health and the environment, was requested by 
the European Commission to identify and 
quantify the health risks related to the use of 
security body scanners based on X-ray 
technology. According to the report of the 
SCENHIR published in 2012, cancer risks 
cannot be entirely excluded from body 
scanning technology, but if they exist, their 
magnitude would be below the baseline cancer 
risk due to other factors.  
A second report issued by the French 
Agency for Environmental and Occupational 
Health (AFSSET) in 2010 at the  request of  
the French government focused on  acquiring  
a complete understanding of the use of security 
body scanners based on active millimeter-wave 
technology. The Agency Concerning 
concluded that no thermal effect on exposed 
tissue was expected following a security body 
scan. The agency reported that the power 
radiated by such a body scanner was much 
weaker than the power radiated by other 
sources of radio frequencies used in everyday 
activities, such as microwave ovens or cell 
phones.  
The conclusion emerging from the two 
reports is that both backscatter and active 
millimeter-wave security body scanners are 
nearly harmless to the health of passengers. 
However, another interesting conclusion 
comes from David J. Brenner in his paper of 
2011 on X-ray backscatter scanners. According 
to him, the radiation doses associated with 
backscatter scanners that are probably safe for 
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most of individuals may have long-term effects 
on the entire exposed population. Dr. Brenner 
added that what one could argue is that risk 
among population would be more than 
balanced by the benefits of reducing the risk of 
a terrorism event.  
In the light of those conclusions contrasting 
with the alarmist titles in the mass media (e.g. 
“Radiation doctor says TSA naked body 
scanners can cause cancer”; NaturalNews, 
January 05, 2012), it would be interesting to 
investigate the passengers‟ views about the 
effect of passing through a scanner on their 
health.  
2.3. Performance issues 
With regard to the performance of security 
scanners, there are two major issues: the 
capability to detect metallic and non-metallic 
objects carried under clothing; the rapidity of 
the algorithms used to analyze data and 
provide the results displayed on the screen.    
First, the capability to detect hidden objects 
is a matter of contrast, and explanations of that 
topic are beyond the scope of this paper (for 
details see, for example, Appleby and 
Anderton, 2007). However, if a potential threat 
is identified, the passenger is invited to 
undergo a manual search by a security officer. 
In addition to being less efficient and more 
time consuming than scanning, a manual 
search is presumed to be highly intrusive (e.g. 
Langerman, 2010). The benefits gained by 
using security scanners would be negated if the 
systems are not reliable. A security scanner can 
be considered unreliable if the rate of false 
positives and/or the rate of false negatives are 
too high. False positives occur when a security 
scanner highlights objects that do not 
constitute threats and false negatives when 
threats are not detected. 
Second, the rapidity of data processing will 
have an impact on passenger flow. Using 
security scanners is presumed to be faster than 
performing manual searches: delays are in the 
terms of seconds for scanning, and of minutes 
for manual search. Short rapid inspection times 
would likely account for an enhanced 
passenger‟s acceptance of security body 
screening as well as it would be a benefit in 
terms of airport authorities (Holguίn-Veras et 
al., 2012).  
To recap, the ideal performance of security 
scanners would be their ability to detect both 
metallic and non-metallic threats in a few 
seconds with a high detection rate and low 
false-alarm rate. That kind of technical 
acceptance should intersect with the 
psychological acceptance of security scanners 
to ensure harmonious and efficient security 
controls. Hence, it would be interesting to 
investigate the passengers‟ views about the 
performance of security scanners. 
The next sections deal with three studies on 
passengers‟ views of those technologies. The 
first study was carried out with air travellers in 
New York City and Tel Aviv, the second one 
in the UK. Both studies come from the review 
of the literature on security body scanners. The 
presentation of the third study that was carried 
out in France in 2012 is the primary goal of the 
present paper.   
3. Two empirical studies in the literature 
on acceptance of security body scanners 
3.1. Leo and Lawler’s study with air 
travellers in the USA and Israel 
The first study, reported by Leo and Lawler 
(2007), focuses on the acceptance of 
backscatter machines. The investigated factors 
were sensitivity to privacy; perception of a 
security threat; knowledge of the functionality 
of screening technologies; knowledge of 
imaging and information storage by screening 
technologies and of their usage. The 
participants were experienced air travellers and 
they received the instrument survey 
questionnaire by e-mail. The responses were 
scored on a 6-point Likert-type scale going 
from none to very high, and the means (M) 
were calculated.  
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The survey conducted in New York shows 
that the 25 participants were not highly 
sensitive either to privacy (M = 3.84) or to the 
severity of the threat of terrorism (M = 3.64). 
They were less perceptive of the effectiveness 
of screening technologies (M = 2.68), less 
knowledgeable about the functioning of 
screening technologies (M = 1.52), and less 
knowledgeable about information storage by 
such technologies (M = 0.84). 
The survey conducted in Tel Aviv shows a 
very high perceived security threat (M = 5.00) 
and perception of the effectiveness of 
screening technologies (M = 5.00) despite no 
knowledge of the data storage, techniques, or 
usage of the technologies (M = 0.00) and no 
privacy sensitivity (M = 0.00). The willingness 
to accept the personal intrusion presented by 
screening technologies was very high (M = 
5.00). 
Leo and Lawler concluded that the “culture 
of security alert, if not fear, and the tangibility 
of security threats in Israel” (Leo and Lawler, 
2007, p. 17) might have made knowledge of 
screening technology not necessary for the Tel 
Aviv participants‟ receptivity of the 
technology.  
The above study is very interesting because 
it illustrates the relationship between perceived 
risk and willingness to accept personal 
intrusion by screening technologies. Leo and 
Lawler‟s study shows also the possible absence 
of relationship between the knowledge of 
screening technologies and the acceptance of 
them. If acceptance of security scanners (i.e. 
intention to undergo scanning) is considered as 
the result of a decision-making process, then 
the acceptance might be influenced by the 
affect heuristic. The affect heuristic, which is a 
mental shortcut that relies on salient affective 
sides of mental imagery, is used in decision-
making involving judgment of risks and 
benefits (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 
2004). In other words, the differences between 
participants‟ attitudes in New York and Tel 
Aviv may be explained by the use of a shortcut 
based on affect (here, fear) which would have 
biased the responses in Tel Aviv‟s study.  
 
3.2. Mitchener-Nissen, Bower, and Ketty’s 
study with air travellers in the UK 
The second study, reported in Mitchener-
Nissen et al., (2012), was conducted in July 
2010 at Manchester Airport. Two 
questionnaires were used to investigate the 
passengers‟ attitudes towards whole-body 
scanners:  the first questionnaire comprised 
two central questions on whether being for or 
against those scanners and the preference 
between a scan and a pat down; the second 
questionnaire included 10 opinion statements 
about the necessity of such scanners with 
regard to threat of terrorism; their impact on 
flight safety; issues of dignity and privacy; 
perception of threat to health.  
Regarding the first questionnaire (N = 225), 
88 percent of the respondents would choose a 
scan over a pat-down. The main reasons of 
their choice are, in order of frequency: less 
intrusiveness; speed; safety/security. The main 
criteria for those who preferred the pat-down 
option were familiarity with pat-down search 
and health concern about scans.  
Regarding the second questionnaire (N = 
186), there were two groups: one group was 
provided detailed information on backscatter 
whole-body scanners, whereas the control 
group did not receive any information. The 
results show that the participants who received 
information had more positive attitudes 
towards body scanners than those who did not.  
The paper of Mitchener-Nissen et al. (2012) 
is interesting because the preference between 
scanners and manual searches was investigated 
in detail; the reasons of the preference were 
questioned. Their study shows the impact of 
knowledge on attitudes, whereas having 
knowledge seems not to have been a major 
factor in Leo and Lawler‟s study. The 
comparison of the two papers suggests that the 
culture and society under study have to be 
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taken into account to understand how 
acceptance is formed.   
4. A French opinion survey on the 
acceptability of security scanners at 
airports 
The study carried out in France in 2012 
aimed at analyzing air travellers‟ acceptability 
of security scanners. The term acceptability is 
chosen because security scanners are not still 
deployed at French airports. The intention to 
undergo scanning and other topics reviewed in 
the previous sections were investigated using a 
survey questionnaire.  
4.1. Method 
The method consisted of a face-to-face 
survey conducted by the public poll institute 
TNS Sofres in July 2012. Outsourcing the 
survey to a research institute was motivated by 
a concern of representativeness of the results. 
Respondents were interviewed at home. The 
weighted sample size of those who had flown 
at least once in the previous 12 months was N 
= 458 (234 men and 223 women). This was 
derived from a representative national sample 
of 2000 people aged 15 and over (quota 
sampling approach).  
The questionnaire contained 14 closed 
items that were developed from the literature 
reviewed in the previous section and discussed 
with TNS Sofres.  
Two items were expressed in terms of trust. 
Indeed, trust can be defined as “a 
psychological state, resulting from knowledge, 
beliefs, and assessments related to the 
decision-making situation, which creates 
confident expectations” (Rajaonah, Anceaux, 
and Vienne, 2006, p. 102). Therefore, 
perceived security scanner technology‟s ability 
to detect hidden threats as well as perceived 
airport authorities‟ performance to ensure 
confidentiality of data provided by the scanner 
may be investigated through the concept of 
trust.  
Three items were related to the perceived 
breaches of privacy and fundamental rights 
posed by security scanning. A YES/NO 
response format was used according to an 
implicit assumption that a violation of 
fundamental rights would not be perceived in 
degrees.  
Two items on the acceptability of security 
scanners investigated behavioural intention 
between three alternatives: undergoing 
scanning, undergoing a hand search, or giving 
up flying (multi-choice response). The first 
item focused on security scanners providing a 
fuzzy image of the body of the passenger, the 
second on those providing an avatar. The 
English translations of the items are presented 
in Table 1.  
A brief presentation of the topic was 
introduced to the participants, with no 
information concerning advanced imaging 
technologies. The English translation of the 
presentation is as follows: “The authorities are 
examining the possibility of deploying security 
scanners at French airports. As these scanners 
are capable of detecting explosives, they are 
much more than portal metal detector systems. 
Potential threats are visualized on a screen that 
displays either a fuzzy image of the body of 
the passenger or a generic avatar that is 
identical for all passengers. Only authorized 
security officers are allowed to examine what 
is displayed on the screen. Lastly, the data 
provided by the scanners are not stored”. 
The questions were asked in a different 
random order for each interview. Slides of a 
fuzzy image
 
and of an avatar were shown three 
times to the participant: at the introduction of 
the questionnaire and at each of the two 
questions on acceptability.  
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Table 1: Items of the questionnaire: the studied factors underlying the questions are in the left column, the items 
of the questionnaire translated from French in the middle, and the response categories in the right column.  
Studied factors Items of the questionnaire Response categories 
1. Perceived threat of 
terrorism 
You feel terrorism threat as present 
4-point scale plus a 
„No opinion‟ category: 
„Strongly agree‟, 
„Rather agree‟, 
„Rather disagree‟ 
„Strongly disagree‟, 
 
2. Perceived health risk 
Passing through security scanners will have 
effect on your health 
3. Perceived efficiency of 
using security scanners 
The use of security scanners would enhance 
control procedure times 
4. Perceived social norm to 
undergo scanning 
Passing through security scanners is normal 
in the fight against insecurity 
5. Trust in the technology 
You trust the security scanner technology to 
detect hidden explosives 
6. Trust in institutions and 
organizations 
You trust airport authorities to guarantee 
anonymity and confidentiality of data 
provided by the scanner 
7. Anticipated experience of 
embarrassment 
The visualization of a fuzzy  image of your 
body on a screen by a security officer is 
embarrassing 
The visualization of a representation of your 
silhouette by a generic avatar is embarrassing 
Manual search on your body by a security 
officer is embarrassing 
8. Perceived breaches of 
fundamental rights 
Security scanner inspection invades private 
life („la vie privée‟ in the French version) 
YES/NO response 
Security scanner inspection invades freedoms 
(„les libertés‟) 
Security scanner inspection invades dignity 
(„la dignité humaine‟) 
9. Acceptability of security 
scanners 
If security scanners providing a fuzzy image of 
the body of the passenger were installed at 
French airports, what would you do?  
Multiple-choice 
response (one response 
only):  
-Undergoing scanning  
-Undergoing a hand 
search 
-Giving up flying 
If security scanners providing a generic 
avatar were installed at French airports, what 
would you do? 
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4.2. Results and Discussion 
The results are divided into four sub-
sections: acceptability; privacy and 
fundamental rights issues; health issues; and 
performance issues.  
The percentage distributions of responses to 
the questions on perceptions and trust are 
presented in Table 2.  
Acceptability 
The acceptability of security scanners was 
investigated in terms of behavioural intention 
to undergo scanning if such systems were 
implemented at French airports.  
More precisely, the respondents had to 
select one response among three alternatives: 
undergoing scanning, undergoing a hand 
search, or giving up flying (multi-choice 
response).  
Two kinds of security scanner were 
investigated depending on the representation 
used by the system to display potential hidden 
objects, either a fuzzy image of the body of the 
passenger or a generic avatar. The results are 
shown in Figure 1. 
With regard to security scanners providing 
a fuzzy image of the body of the passenger, 
most of the respondents (83.3 percent) would 
undergo scanning, whereas 13.4 percent would 
prefer a manual search, and two respondents 
would give up flying. In other words, the 
percentage of the respondents who were 
resistant to the scanning procedure, that is to 
say, those who chose either undergoing a 
manual search or giving up flying, was of 14 
percent. On the other hand, the percentage of 
the respondents who intended to fly whatever 
the procedure at security control (either 
passing through a scanner providing a fuzzy 
image or undergoing a manual search) was 
96.8 percent. 
 
With regard to security scanners providing 
a generic avatar, the great majority of the 
respondents (84.6 percent) would undergo 
scanning, whereas 11.5 percent would prefer a 
manual search and one respondent would give 
up flying. The percentage of the respondents 
who were resistant to the scanning procedure 
was 11.7 percent, and those who intended to 
fly whatever the procedure at security control 
were made up 96.1 percent. 
To recap, the great majority of the 
respondents would undergo scanning whatever 
the representation. These findings are 
remarkably similar to those in Mitchener-
Nissen et al. (2012). Indeed, their study shows 
that the great majority of the passengers 
interviewed were in favour of the use of whole 
body scanners in airports, and they preferred a 
scan to a pat-down. 
However, cause-effect relationships 
between perceptions and acceptability of 
security scanners were not investigated in this 
French study, whereas they were in Mitchener-
Nissen et al.‟s one. For example, these authors 
showed that the safety and security issues were 
the most frequently cited reason for explaining 
preference for whole body scanners, while the 
most cited reason for choosing a scan over a 
pat-down was intrusiveness of pat-down 
search.  
Most of the respondents in France (70.2 
percent) agreed with the statement that they 
felt the threat of terrorism to be present, 
whereas 27.1 percent disagreed. Furthermore, a 
very strong majority of the respondents (91.6 
percent) agreed with the statement that passing 
through a security scanner was normal in the 
fight against insecurity (i.e. insecurity in a 
general way). It might be hypothesized from 
the results that perceived threat of terrorism 
and perceived social norm to undergo scanning 
had influenced the participants‟ intention to 
undergo scanning. 
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Figure 1:  Percentage distribution of responses regarding intentional behaviour at the passenger screening 
procedure by security scanner type (one providing a fuzzy image and the other an avatar). The respondent had to 
select only one response from among the three proposed alternatives: undergoing scanning, undergoing a manual 
search, or giving up flying. 
 
Table 2: Percentage distributions of responses to the questions using a 4-point scale. 
Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Rather agree 
Rather 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
No opinion 
Perceived presence of 
terrorism threat 
28.8% 41.4% 18.7% 8.5% 2.7% 
Perceived effect on health 6.2% 21.2% 28.9% 35.9% 7.8% 
Perceived efficiency of 
using security scanners 
22.1% 41.1% 19.6% 10.1% 7.1% 
Perceived normality to 
undergo scanning 
54.5% 37.1% 5% 2.1% 1.3% 
Trust in security scanners  32.1% 48.8% 11.7% 4.8% 2.5% 
Trust in airport 
authorities 
31.2% 42% 17.3% 6.7% 2.8% 
Embarrassment with a 
fuzzy image 
6.4% 13.7% 31.9% 47.6% 0.3% 
Embarrassment with an 
avatar 
2.1% 11.9% 26.4% 58.4% 1.3% 
Embarrassment with 
manual search 
12.8% 27.3% 26.6% 32.5% 0.8% 
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Health issues 
With regard to health issues, nearly two-
thirds of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that passing through a security 
scanner would have an effect on their health 
(Figure 2 and Table 2).  
 
Figure 2:  Percentage distribution of responses to 
perceived effects on health of passing through a 
security scanner (N = 458). 
 
It is important to notice that more than half 
of the participants who were resistant to scan 
perceived that passing through a security 
scanner would have an effect on their health: 
59.2 percent of the respondents resistant to the 
scanner providing a fuzzy image; 62.8 percent 
for the scanner providing an avatar.  
In Mitchener-Nissen et al. (2012), only 2.7 
percent of the respondents chose the pat-down 
option because of health concerns. Hence, their 
results are not fully similar to those of the 
French study, but it might be that they are not 
comparable. Indeed, the cause-effect 
relationship between resistance to the scanning 
procedure and health concerns can just be 
hypothesized in the French study. 
Privacy and fundamental rights issues 
Results on privacy and fundamental rights 
issues include three parts: perceived breach of 
dignity, freedom, and private life; perceived 
embarrassment due to the visualization of 
passengers‟ images by security officers and 
perceived embarrassment due to manual 
search; trust in airports‟ authorities to protect 
private personal data.  As in shown in Figure 3, the great 
majority of the respondents perceived breaches 
of neither private life nor freedoms or dignity 
(respectively, 83.3 percent, 81.4 percent, and 
79.9 percent of disagreement with the 
statement of perceived breaches).  
 
Figure 3:  Percentages of the respondents who 
perceived a breach to the right to a private life, 
freedom, or human dignity. 
Nevertheless, comparing the results of the 
12.8% of the respondents who seemed to have 
been resistant to the scanning procedure with 
those of all the respondents, it seems that the 
“opponents” might have tended to be a bit 
more sensitive to breaches of their fundamental 
rights (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Perceived breaches of fundamental 
rights:  Means of the percentages between 
responses regarding scanners providing image of 
the body of the passenger and responses regarding 
scanners providing a generic avatar: on the right, all 
the respondents; on the left, the respondents who 
were resistant to the scanning procedure. 
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 Concerning embarrassment due to 
scanning, as shown in Table 2, perceived 
embarrassment tended to occur more 
frequently with an image of the body of the 
passenger (20.1 percent) than with an avatar 
(14 percent).  
However that may be, most of the 
respondents disagreed with the statement on 
embarrassment due to the visualization of 
image by a security officer (79.5 percent in the 
case of an image of the passenger; 84.8 percent 
in the case of a generic avatar).  
Opinions on manual search were less clear-
cut. Indeed, 40.1 percent of the respondents 
globally agreed with the statement that manual 
search was embarrassing and 59.1 percent 
disagreed.   Concerning data protection, the majority 
of the respondents (71.3 percent) agreed with 
the statement that they would trust airport 
authorities to guarantee the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the data provided by security 
scanners (Table 2).  
To recap the results, privacy and 
fundamental rights might have not been a 
problem for most of the participants. The 
question is thus whether there is a gap between 
experts and public‟s views of privacy and 
fundamental rights issues. The response may 
be that two levels of explanation are involved, 
namely the psychological and legal levels. The 
focus of research in the field of psychology is 
on passenger‟s perceptions, while the focus at 
the legal level is on the protection of the 
citizens according to the precautionary 
principle.  
Performance 
Performance issues were investigated with 
two items: trust in security scanners to perform 
required functions and the perceived efficiency 
of using security scanners to move the 
passengers through the security system. The 
responses are shown in Table 2.  
A great majority of the respondents (80.9%) 
agreed to the statement that they would trust 
security scanners to detect hidden explosives. 
The statement that the use of security scanners 
would enhance control procedure times at 
airports was agreed with by 63.3 percent of the 
respondents.  
Security scanners were thus perceived 
positively, despite the possible lack of 
knowledge of the respondents about the 
efficiency of the technology. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, no information about the 
functioning of security scanners was provided 
to the participants. 
Recall that the Tel Aviv participants in the 
Leo and Lawler‟s study perceived the highest 
level of the effectiveness of screening 
technologies, despite no knowledge of their 
functioning (Leo and Lawler, 2007). Recall 
also that Mitchener-Nissen et al. (2012) 
showed that providing information to the 
passengers in the UK enhanced their attitudes 
toward backscatter scanners. The differences 
between those two studies plus the results in 
the French study reinforce the idea that the 
psychological process of acceptance of 
security scanners might not be based only on 
knowledge. How the acceptance of security 
scanners is formed might also involve specific 
values and beliefs shared among the members 
of the society and/or culture under study.  
5. Conclusion  
The study presented in this paper aimed to 
investigate the acceptability of security 
scanners at French airports. The results show 
that undergoing scanning would be chosen by 
the passengers rather than undergoing manual 
search, whatever the representation used by the 
system to display potential hidden objects (a 
fuzzy image of the body of the passenger or a 
generic avatar). The great majority of the 
respondents perceived breaches of neither their 
private life nor their freedoms or human 
dignity. Lastly, despite their possible lack of 
knowledge on the efficiency of the technology, 
most of the respondents trusted security 
scanners to detect hidden explosives.  
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The findings, especially in the light of those 
of the literature on security scanners, suggest 
that studying the acceptance of new 
technologies such as security scanners is more 
relevant if they are considered within their 
sociotechnical environment. Indeed, that 
provides other explanatory factors than 
perceived performance as traditionally studied 
in research on the acceptance. That is 
illustrated on Figure 5.   
The hypothesis could be that the 
passenger‟s response to the stimulus of 
terrorism threat would emerge from the most 
satisfactory cognitive compromise between 
expected benefits, accepted risks, and tolerated 
constraints regarding each alternative (e.g. 
undergoing scanning, undergoing manual 
search, or giving up flying). The compromise 
would be shaped by individual‟s trust and 
perceptions that are themselves shaped by 
knowledge based on information from the 
decision-makers as well as by social and 
cultural values including socially-shared affect 
and worldviews (Peters and Slovic, 1996; 
Slovic, 1999).  
The socially shared values might be the 
chief influence on the cognitive compromise 
that underlies the passengers‟ acceptance. The 
first implication of that viewpoint is the 
importance of taking into account the social 
and cultural factors for providing information 
to the citizens, particularly those who may be 
resistant to the scanning procedure.  
The findings have also implication in terms 
of trust. Indeed, the results show that the 
respondents might have tended to trust both 
technology and institutions in the fight against 
terrorism. Nevertheless, trust is fragile and 
hard to be restored (Muir and Moray, 1996; 
Slovic, 1999). Therefore, recommendations 
should include guidelines to ensure public 
awareness of technologies limitations as well 
as security costs. 
To conclude, the objective of future works 
is to use the proposed model in studies within 
sociotechnical environments of security at 
airports, concerning other technologies of 
security and/or other actors than passengers. 
Qualitative approaches of social sciences 
will be prioritized through techniques such as 
face-to-face semi-directed interviews and/or 
focus-group discussions. Both techniques 
allow researchers to collect in-depth 
information, especially responses to such 
questions of “why” and “how”, which would 
have been very useful to complement the 
quantitative analysis in the French study.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: The passenger‟s acceptance of security scanners: Taking into account the influence of knowledge 
based on information from the decision-makers and the socially shared affect and values on the cognitive 
compromise that underlies acceptance. 
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